Repeated attacks linked to Iran against Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure are raising questions about the effectiveness of U.S.-supplied air defence systems and the ability of Gulf allies to protect critical oil assets, as renewed security concerns add pressure to global crude prices ahead of the U.S. midterm elections.
The latest assault on Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura refinery on October 27 has again drawn attention to the vulnerability of the kingdom’s oil infrastructure. The attack, attributed to Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen, reportedly pushed oil prices up by about one percent, reinforcing concerns that disruptions to Gulf energy facilities can quickly affect international markets.
The 550,000-barrel-per-day refinery is a major component of Saudi Arabia’s downstream industry and supports the country’s crude export system. It was previously targeted in March, when debris from intercepted drones reportedly triggered a fire at the site. The facility also came under a major Houthi drone and missile attack in March 2021.
The latest incident follows another wave of strikes on September 8, when drones and ballistic missiles targeted four cities in southwestern Saudi Arabia: Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran. Energy installations and economic infrastructure associated with state-owned Saudi Aramco were among the reported targets. The attacks caused injuries and fires at several oil facilities, prompting the Saudi Energy Ministry to temporarily suspend operations at some sites and pushing Brent crude prices towards $100 per barrel.
The pattern of attacks has renewed scrutiny of Iran’s role in supporting the Houthis. The report, citing security sources in Washington, London and Berlin, says Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in Tehran have directed previous operations, while Iranian personnel have helped coordinate strikes on the ground in Yemen. Iran has denied responsibility for some of the attacks.
The threat to Saudi energy infrastructure is not new. On September 14, 2019, drone and cruise missile attacks struck Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais processing facilities. The two sites then accounted for about half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production, equivalent to roughly five percent of global supply. The strikes triggered a sharp disruption in output and sent international oil prices up by as much as 20 percent.
Beyond the immediate impact on oil markets, the latest attacks have raised questions about the reliability of the defence systems Gulf governments purchased from the United States. Washington had promoted systems such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), Patriot missile batteries, early-warning radars and U.S.-made drones as key elements of regional protection against missile and drone threats.
However, Iranian attacks during the conflict that began on February 28 under the U.S. operation known as Operation Epic Fury reportedly damaged or disabled several important defence assets. These included the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar in Qatar, multiple AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars across the region, the AN/TPS-59 radar in Bahrain and several MQ-9 Reaper drones.
The reported losses have intensified debate over whether U.S. forces and the military equipment supplied to regional partners can adequately protect Gulf infrastructure from sustained attacks. They also raise concerns about the long-term credibility of Washington’s security commitments to its Middle Eastern allies.
The issue carries wider geopolitical implications. If Gulf governments become less confident in U.S. protection, they could seek stronger security arrangements with other powers, particularly China and Russia. Such a shift would challenge Washington’s efforts to limit the influence of both countries in the region, including through its broader diplomatic framework around the Abraham Accords.
China’s relationship with Iran could also give Beijing greater diplomatic leverage in efforts to reduce regional attacks. The two countries signed a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement, while China has maintained significant economic and strategic ties across the region. Beijing also has influence in Djibouti and Eritrea, near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea shipping corridor, through infrastructure and financing arrangements linked to its Belt and Road Initiative.
The report also points to the passage of Chinese-flagged and Chinese-operated supertankers, including the Cosnew Lake and Xin Long Yang, through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait during the conflict. The vessels reportedly transported millions of barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude without being attacked by the Houthis.
This has added to the argument that China could use its ties with Tehran to influence security conditions along important maritime routes, including the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea passage leading to the Suez Canal.
Meanwhile, the latest Saudi attacks have raised questions about the effectiveness of the Makkah Defence Alliance, established on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.
The arrangement is modelled on NATO’s collective defence principle, under which an armed attack against one member is treated as an attack against all. Its members bring different military and strategic capabilities to the partnership.
Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and regional intelligence networks, while Turkey offers advanced military equipment, defence technology and established production capacity for artillery and drones. Pakistan provides substantial conventional military strength and nuclear capability.
Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif, previously said the country’s full military capabilities would be available under its defence agreements. The alliance has since clarified that its pact is limited to conventional and defensive cooperation.
However, the grouping has yet to demonstrate a coordinated response to the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia on September 8 and October 27, raising questions about its ability to deter further strikes or protect critical infrastructure.
The attacks have also renewed attention on the relationship between energy prices and U.S. domestic politics. The report argues that crude oil prices have a direct influence on American fuel costs, consumer spending and the electoral prospects of sitting presidents and their parties.
Historical estimates cited in the report suggest that a $10-per-barrel movement in crude prices can translate into a 25–30-cent change in the price of a gallon of gasoline. Each one-cent increase in average gasoline prices is estimated to reduce annual U.S. consumer spending by more than $1bn.
The political stakes are significant ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, where fuel prices and inflation remain important issues. Historical data cited in the report indicate that U.S. presidents whose economies avoided recession in the two years before an election won re-election 11 times in 11 contests since 1896. By contrast, presidents who sought re-election while the economy was in recession won only once in seven attempts.
With renewed threats to Gulf oil infrastructure and the possibility of further disruption to shipping routes, developments involving Iran and its regional allies remain a source of uncertainty for oil markets and Washington’s wider security strategy.